Sunday, August 30, 2020

Assignment of Homestead Insurance Proceeds Allowed

 In a recent case, an owner of homestead property assigned post-loss insurance benefits to a third-party contractor. The  insurance company challenged the assignment, asserting it was not allowed by Article X, section 4(c) of the Florida Constitution - apparently not an authorized alienation of a homestead interest by mortgage, sale or gift. Reversing the trial court on a motion for summary judgment, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the Florida Constitution does not bar such an assignment.

Article X, section 4(c) provides in relevant part that "[t]he owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift." The appellate court appears to base its holding on an assignment of post-loss insurance benefits not constituting an "alienation" of the homestead - as such, section (4)(c) does not apply and there is no prohibition. Under Black's Law Dictionary, alienation is defined as the conveyance or transfer of property to another. Since the assignment here was not a transfer of real property, then there was not a transfer of title to real property  - thus, there is no alienation subject to section 4(c).

 

This seems off the mark to me. Insurance benefits relating to damage to a homestead are recognized as protected homestead property. Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. La Croix, 137 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1962); Quiroga v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 34 So. 3d 101 (3rd DCA. 2010). Black's says that an alienation is the transfer of property. Clearly, the insurance proceeds are property. Are they being transferred? That would appear to be the case, as there was an assignment of the proceeds. Thus, there is an alienation of homestead property and the limitations of section 4(c) should apply.

 

While not focused on in the opinion, section 4(c) of Article X does use the terminology "homestead real estate" (emphasis added), and not just the single work "homestead" as used elsewhere in section 4. Perhaps this is the basis of the court's reading that section (4)(c) only applies to a transfer of title to real property, notwithstanding case law that treats insurance proceeds from the damage of homestead real property as being homestead property. However, note that section 4(c) also uses the shorthand phrase "homestead" without "real estate" four times, including in the sentence addressing alienation by mortgage, sale or gift - so it is uncertain if the alienation provision relates only to real estate. Even if the intent was to describe real estate alienations in that provision, the equating of damage insurance proceeds to the homestead property itself (which is of course real estate) would mean that the alienation restriction should likewise apply to the insurance proceeds. Thus, we have here both an alienation (i.e., transfer of property) and the transfer being of constitutionally protected property.

 

Note that the appellate court did not believe Article X, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution to be involved. That provision prohibits a lien from being imposed against homestead property except in the circumstances listed therein (as well as protecting from forced sale). The court did not interpret the assignment as creating a lien. Note that section 4(a) and section 4(c) do interrelate - while section 4(a) prohibits a lien, section 4(c) authorizes a mortgage. Thus, section 4(c) operates in part as an exception to section 4(a), at least if one reads a mortgage as imposing a lien. Section 4(a) also does not allow its prohibitions to be waived through an unsecured agreement.  While at first glance one might believe the cases of Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2007) and  Quiroga to have direct relevance to this case, the appellate court noted that those cases relate to liens under section (4)(a).

 

The appellate court appears to have some doubt on the issue, since it certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance:

 

Does Article X, section 4(c) of the Florida Constitution allow the owner of homestead real property, joined by the spouse, if married, to assign post-loss insurance benefits to a third-party contractor contracted to make repairs to the homestead property?


SPEED DRY, INC. V. ANCHOR PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 5th DCA, Case no. 5D19-3055 (August 21, 2020)

Thursday, May 28, 2020

Single Family Home Still Homestead Property Even Though Bedrooms Are Rented Out

In a recent opinion of the 2nd DCA, the appeals court reversed the trial court and held that an entire single family residence qualified as homestead for creditor protection purposes, even though three of the four bedrooms were rented out.

The court applied a two-part test to determine if the commercial use portion can be severed from the non-commercial use portion, such that the property could be divided into homestead and non-homestead property. The court's analysis was as follows:

In First Leasing, this court suggested a two-part analytical framework in determining if the homestead exemption extends to the entire property: first, the court must determine whether the debtor's residence is a fraction of the entire property; and second, the court must determine whether the property can be severed -- that is, by using an imaginary line the residence can be severed from the remainder of the property. 591 So. 2d at 1153. Applying this test to the single-family residence at issue here, the answer to each question is no. Mr. Anderson's father resided in the home and, like the tenants, shared the common areas of the house. Further, the rented bedrooms in the home cannot be severed from the residence by an imaginary line without destroying its utility as a single-family residence.

Tuesday, June 18, 2019

Limits on Effects of Order Determining Homestead on Title

A recent appellate decision addresses the effect of an order determining homestead vis-à-vis title to the homestead. In the case, a decedent left her homestead by will to her three children. The will also provided a life estate in the property to two of the children. The probate court entered an order determining homestead, which determined that the homestead property was divided in equal shares to the children, but did not mention the life estate provided for in the will. The trial court determined the order determining homestead divested the life tenants from their life estate per the absence of any mention of the life estate (thus allowing partition of the property to proceed on petition of two of the children). Florida’s 5th DCA reversed the trial court, and held that the order determining homestead did not terminate the life estate provided for in the decedent’s will.[1] The appellate court noted that the homestead order did not create new rights, but only explained or clarified the rights that already existed by operation of law.

The appellate court rejected arguments that the children’s consents to the homestead order altered the parties’ individual interests in the estate. It also ruled that the order was not a title transaction within the meaning of Fla.Stats. §712.01(3) noting:

the Homestead Order in this case does not constitute a title transaction, as defined by section 712.01(3), Florida Statutes (2011), extinguishing the life estates in the property. ‘A title transaction within the meaning of this act is defined in section 712.01(3), Florida Statutes, and means any recorded instrument or court proceeding which affects title to any estate or interest in land and which describes the land affected with legal sufficiency.’ Cunningham v. Haley, 501 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Although the probate and recording of a will constitutes a title transaction within the meaning of section 712.01(3), see Mayo v. Owens, 367 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Kittrell v. Clark, 363 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), Kenneth and Carla point to no authority holding or suggesting that an order determining homestead property constitutes the same.

Mullins v. Mullins, No. 5D18-1672, 2019 WL 2396753, at *4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 7, 2019)noting

Thursday, May 23, 2019

Documentary Stamp Tax Newlywed Exception Now Applies to All Married Persons [Florida]

Generally, transfers of real property in Florida are subject to documentary stamp taxes based on the consideration paid. If the real property is subject to a mortgage when transferred, the unpaid balance of the mortgage is counted as consideration for this purpose.

There is no general exception to this rule for transfers between spouses. However, Fla.Stats. §201.02(7)(b) does provide that no documentary stamp taxes will apply to a transfer of homestead property between spouses (a) if the only consideration is the mortgage debt, and (b) the deed or other instrument of transfer is recorded within 1 year of the marriage. Many questioned why this exception was limited to newlyweds.

Effective July 1, 2019, requirement (b) above no longer will apply, per Florida House Bill No. 7123 which has been enacted into law. Thus, spouses can transfer homestead property between themselves, even if encumbered by a mortgage, without documentary stamp taxes – so long as there is no other consideration for the transfer other than the mortgage.

Sunday, December 2, 2018

A Chart to Help You in Planning Homestead Dispositions

I’ve been giving some recent seminars on Florida homestead law. One of the topics I discussed are the limitations on devise of homestead, and some of the obvious and/or hidden planning problems that result when the limitations apply (and how to deal with them when they do arise).

I thought a table that can be used as a quick reference of these problems would be useful. I think this is especially so for attorneys during client discussions or drafting to make sure there is not a hidden problem that was not or is not being considered in planning.

I’ll be inserting this as a new practice aid in Rubin on Florida Homestead. As many of you know, the treatise has an extended discussion of the principal planning that can be done to avoid most of these problems.

I developed some other charts and checklists in these seminars, which I will be rolling out here and in the treatise in the coming weeks.

You can download a PDF of the new table from Dropbox here. Since this is newly developed, if anyone sees any errors or omissions or has other comments, please send me an email at crubin@floridatax.com.

Friday, October 26, 2018

New Inbound Investment Reporting Requirements for Certain Industries


[Oops - this article was published to the wrong blog, but I am leaving it here in case anyone wants to read it]

Regulations have been recently issued under the recently passed Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) to implement a pilot program that expands the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and imposes filing requirements on certain transactions in the U.S. technology sector.
Parties must file a declaration with CFIUS at least 45 days in advance of certain foreign-person investments in unaffiliated U.S. businesses if involved with critical technologies used in specified industry sectors. 27 U.S. industry sectors are involved.
The program will end by March 5, 2020, but permanent reporting requirements may have been put in place by then. It applies to transactions completed on November 10, 2018 or later, although there are other effective date provisions that may apply.
After filing, CFIUS has 30 days to review the declaration and then undertake certain requests for a long-form notice form, initiate a unilateral review, or clear the transaction – or the parties can file the long-form notice initially.
Parties failing to file a required declaration may be subject to a civil penalty up to the amount of the transaction value.
Businesses and professionals involved in assisting with and/or the reporting of inbound investments should add these new reporting requirements to their checklists and lists of reporting requirements.






Thursday, October 11, 2018

The New “Newlywed” Exception to Documentary Stamp Taxes

Florida imposes documentary stamp taxes on transfers of Florida real property. The tax is based on the consideration paid for the property. Generally, if real property that is transferred is encumbered by a mortgage and the purchase price is less than the mortgage amount (or there is nothing otherwise paid), the mortgage amount is treated as consideration for purposes of calculating the tax.

This tax arises on transfers of encumbered real property, even if the transferor and transferee are married to each other. Given other exemptions for intra-spousal transfers under law (e.g., as to the federal estate tax, and under the Save Our Homes cap on ad valorem taxes), this is surprising and somewhat disheartening. Oddly enough, Florida law will NOT impose the tax on transfers of a marital home between spouses or former spouses when the transfer is incidental to a divorce. Fla.Stats. §201.02(7)(a). Of course, if there is no mortgage on the property and nothing is paid for the property, an intra-spousal transfer will not be subject to stamp taxes.

Under a new provision of law that came into effect in July, spouses can now transfer encumbered homestead property between themselves without incurring documentary stamp taxes, if no other consideration is paid. However, this new provision applies only to transfers within one year of marriage. Therefore, newlyweds can use it – spouses who have been married over a year cannot. This one year limit is also a trap for unwary newlyweds – if they take more than a year to reorganize their real property holdings, the tax will apply.

As noted, the transferred property must be homestead property. The applicable definition of “homestead” for this purpose is the ad valorem tax definition under Fla.Stats. §192.001 and the ad valorem tax provisions of s. 6(a), Art. VII of the Florida Constitution.

Any tax exemption is a good exemption (from the perspective of taxpayers), but the limitation of this new exception to newlyweds seems unduly restrictive. It appears to allow newlyweds to add a spouse to the title as part of new marriage restructuring, but why not open it up to other transfers? For example, spouses that desire to transfer homestead property owned by one spouse to TBE so as to allow for an automatic transfer at death to the surviving spouse should be able to do so without the tax. As matters stand now, if there is a large mortgage on the property, the stamp taxes can make such transfers and planning cost prohibitive.

Fla.Stats. §201.02(7)(b)